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 In the first part of the text, the author lists standard theoretical arguments 
used in the debates about parliamentarism and presidentialism and points up 
the ways of their contextualisations and instrumentalisations in Eastern Europe 
as a transitional region of unconsolidated democracies. In the second part she 
deals with the approaches and difficulties in the classification of empirical con-
stitutional systems in Eastern Europe. In the third part she highlights several 
sources of real and potential institutional and political conflicts which are 
caused by certain constitutional designs in some countries. 
 
 1. Problems of “constitutional choice”: on the advantages and 
  disadvantages of parliamentarism and presidentialism 
 One of the central issues in the creation of democratic political institu-
tions in postcommunist countries of Eastern Europe has been the choice 
of the constitutional system of government. Arend Lijphart (1991, 1992a) 
thinks that the new democracies are confronted with two key 
“constitutional choices”: that of the electoral system and that of the type 
of the relationship between the legislature and the executive. The choice 
among “the grand alternatives” in these institutional areas defines the gen-
eral model of democracy: if the majority electoral system is chosen and 
the presidential form of government, the majoritarian or competitive model 
of democracy will ensue; if, on the other hand, the proportional electoral 
system and the parliamentary type of government are institutionalized, the 
consociational or consensual model of democracy will emerge. Without un-
duly downsizing the importance of the electoral system, Lijphart thinks 
that opting for the parliamentary or the presidential system of government 
represents “probably the most significant institutional difference” among the 
contemporary democracies (1992, 1). Matthew S. Shugart (1993) also claims 
that the choice between parliamentarism and presidentialism is the central 
constitutional issue of new democracies.1 
 
  1For the description of the models of parliamentary and presidential systems of 
government, see the classic analysis by Douglas V. Verney (1992). 
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 The theories have mostly revolved around the question which institu-
tional system is “better” for the new democracies and the advantages and 
disadvantages of both have been enumerated. By and large, these discus-
sions have used standard arguments which are, more or less, geographi-
cally, historically and politically contextualized. 
 The advantages of parliamentarism are, basically, threefold: 
 - a more inclusive system of government, which enables all major social 
groups (including important ethnic minorities which exist in most easteuro-
pean countries) to take part in government; 
 - a more flexible system of government which enables a smooth transi-
tion of governments and a speedier acclimatization to the political and so-
cial challenges which the unconsolidated democracies and undeveloped mar-
ket economies of postcommunist countries are faced with; 
 - a more suitable system of government for the countries in democratic 
transition, since it broadens the space for the development of a number 
of democratic institutions and procedures, such as parliamentary opposition, 
political coalitions, negotiations, compromises, consensus, and alike. 
 The advocates of parliamentarism, on the other hand, have focused 
more on the criticism of presidentialism than on the praise of parliamenta-
rism. Such a negative strategy of argumentation should lead to the conclu-
sion that parliamentarism avoids, or at least tones down, the institutional 
and political problems which the new democracies are confronted with if 
they institutionalize the presidential type of government. The critique of 
presidentialism (the same criticisms apply to the earlier transitional proc-
esses, particularly those in Latin America; Thibaut/Skach, 1994) can be 
summed up as follows:  
- presidentialism is a paradigmatic example of an exclusive system of gov-
ernment in which “winner takes it all” and thus effectually excludes from 
government big social groups and ethnic minorities, which jeopardizes the 
stability of new democracies; 
- presidentialism enhances political polarization, weakens the role of politi-
cal parties (particularly political opposition2) and the parliament in general 
in recruiting the ruling elite and thus thwarts the creation of stable coali-
tions; 
 
  2Juan J. Linz claims that in a presidential system of government, parliamentary 
opposition is literally jeopardized. “...The conviction that he is in the possession of 
an independent authority and the people's mandate, will probably fill a president 
with a sense of power and mission, even when the majority by which he has been 
elected is minimal. Due to such notions of his position and role, he will likely 
view the inevitable opposition to his political programme with a more disagreeable 
and hateful eye than a prime minister...” (1992, 123). 
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- it establishes the unipersonal executive structure which weakens the de-
liberative and compromise-oriented processes of decision-making; 
- it stands in the way of creating different majorities in the legislature 
and the executive, the so-called divided government, which can cause the 
paralysis of the process of political decision-making and trigger a conflict 
between the government and the opposition. In such circumstances, politi-
cal protagonists are more in favour of authoritarian mechanisms of con-
flict-solution, which do not exclude the arbitrary intervention of the mili-
tary in civilian politics; 
- on the whole, it is a rigid and inflexible institutional arrangement which 
finds it difficult to come up with the true answers to the political and so-
cial crises in the country and adapts to changing circumstances with diffi-
culty; 
- it steps up personalization and clientelism in politics, as well as servility 
and servitude of individuals, and thus contributes to the survival of the 
authoritarian style of government and the servile political culture, typical 
of communist regimes.  
 However, the advocates of presidential systems claim that the critique 
of presidentialism is largely a matter of principles and is out of context 
and does not take into account the historical and political state of affairs 
in which it might be functional and desirable. Such a state, they claim, 
exists in the new, posttotalitarian and postauthoritarian democracies, for 
which presidentialism is suitable for numerous reasons. The presidential 
system thus: 
- guarantees the stability of the executive government, extremely important 
in the circumstances of unconsolidated democracy;3 
- establishes the direct responsibility of the government to the voters re-
garding the choice of policies, and makes political relationships in general 
more graspable and transparent to individuals unfamiliar with democratic 
political mechanisms; 
- establishes in the function of the president of the state the institution of 
“arbiter”, since parties are unprofiled and unstructured. The nature of po-
litical parties diminishes the credibility of their coalition-making and ruling 
potentials, so dear to the advocates of parliamentary systems. 
 
  3The generally accepted argument that presidentialism guarantees a stronger and 
more stable executive government than parliamentarism is disproved by Scott 
Mainwaring who says that presidentialism is based on the division and the balance 
of power, but that this balance frequently results in certain inflexibility of 
government which may bring about the collapse of the entire democratic system 
(1992, 112, 113). 
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 In their argumentation strategy, the partisans of presidentialism have 
used both real and potential flaws of parliamentarism, the most conspicu-
ous being: 
- the establishment of weak and unstable governments, which contributes 
to an increase in the uncertainty and instability of new democracies; 
- the lack of a clear system of responsibilities, i.e. the dispersion of politi-
cal liability on a great number of political institutions and protagonists;4 
- abetting fractionalization of already unstructured and unprofiled parties in 
the parliament which results in fractional instead of party parliamentarism.5  
 
 2. Institutional preferences and institutional choice 
 Theoretical considerations are usually not decisive in choosing a certain 
institutional option. The choice is, above all, influenced by institutional 
preferences of central political protagonists; the preferences are an expres-
sion of their political interests, goals and values. In order to explain how 
certain institutional solutions in Eastern Europe came into being, it is nec-
essary to answer two questions: 
- who were the main protagonists of the process of democratic transition; 
- which were their institutional preferences. 
 The starting point of more recent analyses of democratic transition in 
Eastern Europe is the fact that the most prominent role in the initial 
phases of political liberalization and democratization of communist regimes 
was played by two categories of political protagonists: the old communist 
and the new anticommunist elite. Based on the balance of power between 
them, various models of democratic transition developed. They can be 
roughly divided into three types of political system change: directed 
changes, negotiated changes and capitulation. Without delving further into 
 
  4Unlike the dispersion of political responsibility, within the presidential system, 
responsibility, like power, is clearly concentrated in the institution of the president. 
In order to prevent such presidential power from deteriorating into authoritarian 
political tendencies, presidential power might be curbed through one of the 
following four constitutional mechanisms: 1. banning reelection, 2. limiting the 
number of mandates, 3. imposing a lapse of a certain period of time prior to 
reelection, and 4. banning the members of president's family to run for presidency. 
These measures come within the category of the so-called “purposeful violation of 
democratic principles”. 
  5The concept of “fractional parliamentarism” is historically most often linked 
with the Weimar Republic and its institutional system, which included a 
proportional electoral system and a semipresidential type of government (see 
Kluxen, 1983, 233). 
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a more detailed description of these models,6 for the time being it will 
suffice to say that in the directed model of democratic transition, the 
dominant role was played by the old elite, in the negotiated transition the 
clout of the old and the new elite was balanced, while in the case of ca-
pitulation the new political elite had the upper hand.  
 An analysis of political preferences of the old and the new political 
elites is not a straightforward task. First, neither of these two groups of 
main political protagonists came up with a set of consistent thinking about 
the new institutional and political system. Comprehensive visions of demo-
cratic models which include certain political institutions can be ascribed to 
them only provisionally. The analysis of concrete examples will show that 
the national elites within both groups of political protagonists were in fa-
vour of institutional eclecticism, i.e. a mixture of institutional arrangements 
which are otherwise strictly separated in the theoretical democratic models. 
However, there is no denying that there were certain regularities in the 
way central protagonists opted for certain institutional solutions. Second, 
individual protagonists changed their institutional preferences in the course 
of the process of democratic transition, the consequence of the change in 
their political status and, accordingly, their interests, goals and perceptions. 
While in stable and consolidated democracies the main political protago-
nists accept the basic institutions and challenge them only in extreme 
cases, in new and unconsolidated democracies, protagonists are much more 
prone to “put at disposal” the basic institutions, procedures and rules of 
political life, i.e. change them if dissatisfied with their effects. In this, they 
do not usually change their relationship towards the entire institutional set, 
but solely towards some of its parts. If we assume that institutional sets 
are rather homogeneous wholes consisting of certain institutional solutions, 
then a change of some of its parts impairs the whole and endangers the 
functioning of the entire arrangement. A typical example of the hiatus cre-
ated by a partial alteration of institutional preferences is the open or la-
tent institutional conflict, a result of the combination of the proportional 
electoral system and the presidential form of government in the same in-
stitutional system. 
 The original institutional preferences of central political protagonists can 
be traced back to their opinions prior to the first free elections, the first 
step in the institutionalization of pluralist democracy. Most analysts think 
that the views of major protagonists - the dominant communist party and 
the political opposition - went separate ways regarding the two constitu-
tional choices: the electoral system and the type of government. The ruling 
communist party, as a rule, preferred the majority electoral system and the 
presidential type of government, while the noncommunist opposition opted 
for the proportional electoral system and the parliamentary republic. Since 
 
  6For details of the patterns of democratic transition in Eastern Europe see in 
Kasapovi}, 1996. 
 
Kasapovi}, M., Parliamentarism and..., Politi~ka misao, Vol. XXXIII, (1996), No. 5, pp. 120—135 125 
                                                                                                                                              
these two solutions are closely linked with a number of other institutional 
arrangements and relations - party system, parliamentary structure, etc. - it 
is considered that this disagreement was, as a matter of fact, a sort of a 
polarization regarding democracy models in general. Thus the dominant 
party favoured the majority democracy, and the opposition pluralist or con-
sociational democracy (see Colomer, 1995; Janda, 1992; Lijphart, 1991, 
1992; Markus, 1994).  
 Three hypotheses ensue from the preceding arguments: 
- the directed model of democratic transition gave rise to the presidential 
or “strong” semipresidential system of government; 
- the negotiated system institutionalized the combined parliamentary-presi-
dential systems of government; 
- the capitulation of the old regimes inaugurated parliamentary systems of 
government. 
 Furthermore, by the end of 1996 in most easteuropean countries there 
occurred the change of political elites;7 consequently, it should be expected 
that the new political elites have institutionalized the parliamentary system 
of government and that it became the prevalent constitutional model in 
the region. However, the following Table proves the contrary. 
 The classification is not based on the categorial dichotomy parliamenta-
rism-presidentialism, but takes into account the intermediary types of gov-
ernment. Such an approach is necessary in studying political regimes in 
postcommunist countries of Eastern Europe, which abound with the “in-be-
tween types”. They are generally considered characteristic for transitional 
countries and most frequently occur in the periods of crises of totalitarian 
and authoritarian regimes. They are mostly regarded transitional and tem-
porary, being linked with crises of the existing political institutions and 
disappear with the consolidation of the new democratic regimes. On the 
other hand, the champions of the intermediary forms of government claim 
that they are better fitted for a more permanent survival, since they have 
the advantages of both “pure” types of government but without their dis-
advantages. A particularly successful combination of the advantages of 
“pure” parliamentarism and “pure” presidentialism in the parliamentary-
presidential systems of government is, for example, the combination of di-
rect presidential elections and the stability of the executive government on 
the one hand and the flexibility of the parliamentary government and 
prime minister, on the other.  
 
  7By the end of 1996, the old communist elites, i.e. successor leftist parties in 
which they were organisationally rallied, remained in power solely in Serbia and 
Montenegro. Thus these two countries did not live up to the most undemanding 
criterion of democratic consolidation - the peaceful change of power after the 
universal demise of communist regimes in Eastern Europe. 
 
Kasapovi}, M., Parliamentarism and..., Politi~ka misao, Vol. XXXIII, (1996), No. 5, pp. 120—135 126 
                                                                                                                                              
 As can be seen from the table, “pure” parliamentary or, especially, 
“pure” presidential systems have been established in a rather small number 
of countries; most countries have opted for one of the transitional, semi-
presidential forms.8 A precise analysis of the relationship between the leg-
islative and the executive distinguishes among various intermediary types of 
government. On the whole, it seems that the most suitable typology for 
the analysis of the constitutional systems of easteuropean countries up to 
now is the differentiated five-item typology by M. S. Shugart. 
 
Table 1: Constitutional systems in Eastern Europe 1995 
Country Parliamentarism Presidentialism Semipresidentialism 




Belarus  *  
Bulgaria *   
Czech Republic *   
Estonia *   
Croatia   * 
Lithuania  *  
Latvia   * 
Hungary *   
Macedonia   * 
Moldova   * 
Poland   * 
Romania   * 
Russia  *  
Slovakia *   
Slovenia *   
Serbia   * 
Ukraine   * 
 
 1. “Pure” presidential system: presidents of the state are elected in 
general direct elections; they are the chief executives who appoint the 
members of the cabinet. The paradigm of such constitutional type of gov-
ernment is American presidentialism, while its geographically most wide-
spread version is the Latin American caudillism. Shugart thinks that the 
 
  8For the definition of semipresidentialism see the classic essays by Maurice 
Duverger (1992) and Jean Blondel (1992). Duverger defines the semipresidential 
system by three structural elements: 1. the general and direct presidential elections; 
2. great authority of the president; 3. the dichotomy between prime minister and 
the cabinet and the president of the state, since the former can retain their 
positions solely if they enjoy parliamentary confidence (1992, 142). 
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“pure” presidential system in Eastern Europe has been established only in 
some successor-countries of the Soviet Union, such as Armenia and 
Kirghistan. However, Gert-Joachim Glaessner claims that it is also charac-
teristic for Serbia and Russia (1994, 249). Stefanie Babst also thinks that 
Russia has the presidential form of government (1994, 296), while Michael 
Brie speaks of “a presidential dictatorship legitimised by direct elections” 
in that country (1996, 164). Stephen Holmes argues that in Russia there 
has emerged a sort of “semipresidentialism” in which there is no Ameri-
can-type division of power and the legislative and the executive powers are 
combined in the institution of the president of the state, who has legisla-
tive authority in the form of the right to issue decrees with legal force. 
Because of these powers of the president of the state, Russian democracy 
is sometimes graphically described as “decreecracy”. Presidents have the 
right of veto on parliament's decisions, they may dissolve the parliament, 
while there is no possibility of a reciprocatory action by the parliament, 
which cannot block presidential ordinances (1994, 123). Unlike him, how-
ever, Wolfgang Merkel does not classify the Russian system of government 
as presidential; he is of the opinion that the sole “pure” presidential type 
of government has been established in Belorus, “a variant of a plebiscitary 
legitimised presidential dictatorship” within the framework of “delegated 
democracy” (1996, 79).9 
 2. Primeministerial - presidential system or “primeministerial presiden-
tialism”: presidents are elected in general direct elections and they nomi-
nate candidates for prime ministers. Presidents have the right to dissolve 
the parliament and call new elections and the right of vetoing parliamen-
tary decisions. The paradigm of such type of government is France”s Fifth 
Republic.  
 Shugart claims that in Eastern Europe “primeministerial presidentialism” 
has been created in Romania. But Merkel thinks that this type of gov-
ernment can also be found (besides Romania) in Croatia, Yugoslavia, Lat-
via and Poland (1996, 79). Ellen Boss says that the model of France's 
Fifth Republic was the model for Russia's constitution (1996, 188, 195-
196.)10  
 3. Presidential-parliamentary system or “presidential parliamentarism”; as 
before, presidents are elected in general direct elections. Presidential par-
liamentarism is similar to the “pure” presidential system insofar the par-
liament has no right of confidence vote, but presidents cannot dissolve the 
cabinet. Since the authority over the cabinet is not institutionally envis-
aged, “a conflict between the legislative and the executive is likely” 
 
  9The concept of “delegated democracy” is by Guillermo O'Donnell (1994). 
  10Fathers of Russian constitution declare that using the French model was 
intentional since the crisis in which France found itself in the late 1950s is 
completely comparable to the one in Russia in the early 1990s (Boss, 1996, 196). 
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(Shugart, 1993, 30). The paradigm of such type of government is Weimar 
Germany.11  
 Shugart points out that such a system has been established in Russia 
and Ukraine. Merkel thinks the same but reminds us that in these two 
countries there are strong structural elements of “pure” presidentialism 
(1996, 79). However, Glaessner asserts that Polish and Croatian systems 
belong to this constitutional type (1994, 249), while Friedbert W. Rueb 
thinks that Croatia is the “prototype” of such constitutional structure 
(1993, 89). 
 4. The parliamentary system with a directly elected president: although 
president is directly elected by the voters, he/she cannot dissolve the par-
liament nor appoint the cabinet; the latter task is in the competence of 
the parliament. 
 Shugart says that such a system has been institutionalized in Bulgaria, 
Estonia and Slovenia. His opinion is supported by Alfred Stepan and 
Cindy Skatch (1993, 4). Glaessner, however, claims that such figurehead 
presidency exists in Bulgaria and Slovenia. Bulgarian politologists and law-
yers, however, claim that the parliamentary republic of Bulgaria includes a 
number of features of the presidential system of government which has 
enabled the president of the state to emerge as a “factor” in the crisis of 
the government and the parliament (see Petkov, 1994, 116). Macedonia 
belongs to the circle of countries in which the figurehead presidency was 
established formally and legally though experts for Macedonian political 
structures claim that it has been de facto transformed into a true presi-
dential regime (Hatschikjan, 1996, 133).  
 5. “Pure” parliamentary system: presidents are elected by the parlia-
ment, and the parliament appoints the members of the cabinet. 
 Shugart and Glaessner agree that such “pure” parliamentarism has been 
established in Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Albania. Stepan and 
Skatch mention only Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia (1993, 4). 
 
  11Friedbert W. Rüb states that the Weimar Constitution of 1918 was “the first 
ever constitution which established semipresidential government...” He thinks it was 
responsible for the impossibility of stabilizing democracy in Germany and the 
collapse of the entire democratic political regime (1993, 88, 96). In the classic 
discussion about the political system of Weimar Germany, Karl Dietrich Bracher 
(1962) says that that regime was an attempt to “link the unlinkable”: the 
parliamentary and the presidential democracy. In such “mixing and the dualism od 
parliamentary and presidential democracy” (215), basic principles of democratic state 
of law, political responsibility and political control were trampled down. Two 
popularly elected bodies of authority - president of the state and the parliament - 
went separate ways which undermined the continuity and the stability of the 
government, weakened the readiness for compromise and the responsibility of the 
parliament and the parties. In its fundamental traits, that “virtual parliamentarism” 
lent itself to the emergence of a presidential dictatorship (218). 
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Reub thinks that “simple” parliamentary systems have been set up in 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, and Hungary, while in other countries 
there is a sort of “mixed” governmental systems (1993, 87-88). 
 The five mentioned constitutional systems in the table have been com-
pressed into three. The parliamentary system with a directly elected presi-
dent has been included within the category of parliamentary systems, while 
primeministerial-presidential and presidential-parliamentary systems were in-
cluded into intermediary and semipresidential types of government. Such 
“compressing technique” is disputable due to several reasons. 
 First, direct popular presidential elections are considered the essential 
structural element of the presidential systems of government. Owing to 
such a type of elections, president emerges, together with the parliament, 
as an agent of sovereignty, which determines political legitimacy and the 
import of that institution. Popularly elected presidents of states thus feel 
invited to take up a more active role in the political lives of their respec-
tive countries from the one stipulated by the constitution and the law, as 
is demonstrated by the examples of Bulgaria and Macedonia. On the basis 
of their real political role and power, the constitutional systems of these 
countries could be categorized as nonparliamentary or semipresidential re-
gimes. Nevertheless, the formal and legal criteria of classification prevail 
plus the fact that popularly elected presidents, unlike their counterparts in 
semipresidential regimes, have no constitutional powers. Second, the differ-
ences between the primeministerial-presidential and presidential-parliamen-
tary systems are by no means so unimportant to be easily glossed over. 
At the same time, the analysts differ in their views on the twofold cate-
gorisation of various constitutional types.12 That is why these two catego-
ries of constitutional systems have been included in the category of semi-
presidential systems to which, despite all the differences, they belong. The 
most significant uncategorized example is the constitutional system of Rus-
sia; on the basis of the constitutional powers of Russian presidents, it has 
been included in the category of presidential regimes.13  
 The starting hypotheses have proved only partly true. 
 The system change that was initiated - and in some countries continued 
- as “a directive from above”, in many countries gave rise to the creation 
of presidential and powerful semipresidential systems (Belarus, Croatia, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Russia, Serbia, and Ukraine). They have 
 
  12Due to some general classificatory difficulties, James P. McGregor gave up on 
the standard typologization of the constitutional systems of the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe and analysed them according to 19 criteria of institutional 
relations among the president of the state, the parliament and the government 
(1996, 162). 
  13For a review of the constitutional powers of Russian president see in Westen, 
1994, 822-824. 
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remained in power after the first change of political elites in the first or 
the second elections in some of these countries. That is the proof that 
the new political elites have not unanimously opted for parliamentarism. 
They may have done it publicly, but it is obvious they had hidden 
political preferences whose promulgation they regarded politically harmful 
in certain circumstances.14 Within this model of system change, 
parliamentarism has been institutionalized in Albania, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Estonia, Latvia, and Slovenia. That, on the other hand, is the evi-
dence that the old communist political elites did not like-mindedly prefer 
the presidential system of government . 
 The awareness that the new political elites were not uniformly and uni-
versally in favour of creating the parliamentary systems of government is 
partly proved by the examples of two other models of system change. Af-
ter the Romanian revolution and the capitulation of the old political elite, 
the formally new elite set up a “strong” semipresidential system of gov-
ernment; but this can be explained by the fact that the new elite was 
really “the second cadre” of the old political elite, i.e. there was no real 
change of the elites. Unlike Romania, in the former Czechoslovakia, fol-
lowing the capitulation of the old regime, the new political elite estab-
lished a true parliamentary system. Czech Republic and Slovakia split, but 
the system has survived in both states.  
 The negotiated system change has given rise to a miscellany of consti-
tutional systems. It is a formal paradox that in the countries with the 
strongest anticommunist opposition, for example in Poland, a semipresiden-
tial system emerged, while in the ones with the weakest opposition (in 
Bulgaria, for example), a parliamentary system was created. Truth to tell, 
in Hungary, the old political elite opted for a sort of presidential govern-
ment, while the opposition favoured parliamentary government. This re-
sulted in the lack of an interest-based compromise, and the matter had to 
be resolved by means of a plebiscite, which was held in 1989 and tilted 
the scales in favour of parliamentarism.  
 On the whole, it could be said that the biggest deviations from the at-
tributed original institutional preferences of the central protagonists of 
these transitional processes - particularly the new national political elites - 
have occurred in constitutional systems. These deviations have primarily 
taken the form of the opting of larger numbers of new national political 
elites for presidentialism or semipresidentialism; they have also manifested 
in the parliamentary orientation of a fraction of the old, reform-minded 
communist elites. The most remarkable example of such “preferential con-
version” was Poland. In that country, the reformed left - together with the 
liberal wing of the noncommunist political elite - ardently championed a 
 
  14”Protagonists’ preferences are not explicitly stated in full or are even falsified 
due to tactical reasons. That is why one should distinguish between the public, 
outward preferences and the hidden preferences” (Prittwitz, 1994, 16). 
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parliamentary republic, while the political forces of the right and centre-
right, particularly those rallied around the “Solidarity” movement or its off-
shoots, were in favour of the presidential form of government (Schade, 
1995, 640). Considering that in the “negotiated Sejm” - which lasted from 
the semicompetitive elections of 1989 until the competitive elections of 
1991 and which was organized along the lines of the preagreed division of 
power between the communists and the anticommunist opposition at the 
ratio of 65:35 - the left had the majority, the semipresidential type of 
government was legalized only after the change in the balance of political 
power after the 1990 presidential elections and the 1991 parliamentary 
elections. The new president, Lech Walesa, the new “rightist” majority in 
the Sejm, as well as the old “rightist” majority in the Senate, were aco-
lytes of the institution of “strong presidency”. 
 
 3. Sources of potential institutional conflicts and crises 
 The main source of institutional conflicts and crises in the new democ-
racies of Eastern Europe is the simultaneous institutionalization of propor-
tional electoral models on the one hand, and the presidential and semi-
presidential systems of government on the other. The empirical data show 
that from 1990 until the end of 1996, the proportional system had slowly, 
but surely, emerged as the dominant institutional choice in the new de-
mocracies of Central and Eastern Europe. While, for example, the first 
competitive elections in 1990 were organized proportionally in 37.5% of 
the existing new democracies, at the beginning of 1996 it was institution-
alized in 57.9% of these countries. Furthermore, it was applied to a 
smaller or larger extent, within the segmented electoral systems. The pro-
portional model has gained the upper hand at the expense of the majority 
system and somewhat at the expense of the combined electoral model. 
The direct consequence of such institutional development regarding elec-
toral systems was the creation of multiparty parliamentary systems, which 
mostly implies the formation of coalition governments. 
 On the other hand, by the end of 1996, in most new democracies, a 
presidential or semipresidential system of government was institutionalized. 
It should be pointed out, however, that it was mostly linked with the ma-
jority (Belorus, Macedonia, Ukraine) and the combined electoral system 
(Croatia, Lithuania, Russia). But in several countries (Moldova, Poland, 
Romania, Serbia), the proportional electoral system and the multiparty par-
liamentary system with the presidential or strong semipresidential type of 
government were institutionally combined. The historical experience shows 
that the rare stable presidential democracies were linked with the existence 
of a two-party system or a dominant party system (Mainwaring, 1992, 113). 
Such systems, formally, do not exist in any easteuropean country. In some 
of them we could speak of the domination of certain ideological and po-
litical blocs, but they are in no way stable political organizations. The 
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dominant procommunist and prorussian bloc in the Belorussian parliament 
relies on the majority of formally independent delegates.  
 Presidential governments generally run into difficulties if there is the 
opposition majority in the parliament. Such situation usually triggers off a 
conflict between the executive and the legislative government which is then 
sometimes resolved by the president’s circumventing the parliament and the 
creation of parapolitical bodies which take over the parliament’s compe-
tences. In the worst scenarios, a president may decide to declare the state 
of emergency and dissolve the parliament. 
 Clashes between presidents and parliaments have led to the fall of gov-
ernments and political crises in several easteuropean countries. In Poland, 
for example, president Lech Walesa literally extorted the fall of the coali-
tion government of prime minister Pawlak, which enjoyed the majority 
support in the Sejm after the 1993 elections. The conflict between the 
president and the cabinet officially began by disagreements over the ap-
pointment of foreign and defence ministers. After having forced the prime 
minister to resign, Walesa took on the legislative parliament house and 
threatened to dissolve it unless the national budget is passed. The parlia-
ment reciprocated by threatening the president with the abolition of presi-
dency in the existing form and by transforming Poland into a parliamen-
tary republic (Freundenstein, 1995). The hostilities came to an end after 
the candidate of the reformed leftist majority party in the Sejm came out 
victorious in the 1996 elections.  
 In Bulgaria in 1994, the president was instrumental in bringing about 
the fall of the so-called non-party government of Ljuben Berov, whom he 
had personally picked out for the job in the first place and appointed as 
prime minister, though he was not a member of either of the two parlia-
mentary fractions. The consequence of the fall of that government were 
the third early elections in 1994. The most serious conflicts between the 
parliament and the president have been those in Russia. These conflicts 
ensued from the differences in the views on the country’s structure of 
government and peaked around the issues connected with the Constitution. 
Since the negotiations between the parliament and the president about the 
new constitution had failed, the president dissolved the People’s Congress 
of Deputies and the Supreme Soviet in September of 1993, called the new 
elections in December of the same year as well as a plebiscite on the 
new Russian Constitution which won 56.6% of the votes (Slater, 1994). 
However, the conflicts between the parliament and the president continued 
after the elections and the adoption of the new Constitution (Tolz, 1994) 
and very often affected the fate of the cabinet. The underlying reason for 
this discord was the fact that the president had no overwhelming party or 
coalition majority in the parliament. Nevertheless, such tendencies are not 
characteristic solely for the states with the semipresidential and presidential 
systems. A bitter battle between the president and the prime minister 
shook Slovakia, since the latter turned into a factual and very 
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authoritarian head of state. According to the Slovakian Constitution, the 
president appoints and recalls the members of the cabinet following the 
prime minister’s suggestions. Owing to the discretionary right to block the 
prime minister’s decisions - such as the recall of ministers without the 
prior agreement of the parliament - the president turned into a formal, 
albeit weak counterbalance to the institution of prime minister and the 
despotism of Vladimir Me~iar, directed against the parliament as well as 
against the president, whom he declared personally responsible for the 
destruction of “his” government. In this case, the president served as the 
institutional barrier against the prime minister*s tyranny, who crossed 
swords with the president and the parliament (Stein/Orenstein, 1996, 137). 
Such political tendencies in Slovakia might lead to the demand for the in-
troduction of the institution of a directly elected prime minister who 
would then, in fact, turn into a real head of state within the framework 
of “primeministerial presidentialism”. 
 
 4. Conclusion 
 The type of the constitutional system is surely a major factor in politi-
cal relations in the new easteuropean democracies. However, the formal, 
constitutional and legal institutionalization of parliamentary, presidential or 
semipresidential system of government does not in itself augur either a 
propitious or inauspicious political progress.  
 Each political institution operates in certain historical and political or 
social and cultural circumstances which determine the effects and the achi-
evements of the institutional activity. As this text has set out to show, in 
Eastern Europe we distinguish between the constitutional systems de iure 
and de facto. This means that in a number of countries throughout this 
vast transitional area there is a smaller or bigger gap between the consti-
tutional and legal and the real political functions and the nature of politi-
cal institutions. That is why constitutional experts and politologists find 
themselves in an awkward situation when called upon to classify the con-
stitutions of specific countries. It might be said that the best way out of 
this predicament would be to make separate legal-scientific and politologi-
cal classifications which would clearly point out the existing problem areas. 
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